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Abstract
Human intelligence has evolved along with the use of more and more sophisticated tools, allowing
Homo Faber (from Homo Habilis to Homo Sapiens Sapiens) to cope with environment changes,
as well as to adapt the environment to his needs. Analogously, in this seminal paper we introduce
the notion of Agens Faber, conveying the idea that agent intelligence should not be considered
as separated by the agent ability to perceive and aﬀect the environment—and so, that agent
intelligence is strictly related to the artefacts that enable, mediate and govern any agent (intelligent)
activity.
Along this line, we ﬁrst discuss the notion of artefact for MAS in general, then we try to devise out
the admissible / required / desirable features of an artefact for MAS. We elaborate on the many
sorts of possible relations between agents and artefacts, focusing in particular on the issue of the
rational exploitation of artefacts, and also rough out a possible taxonomy of artefacts for MAS.
Keywords: Agent Intelligence, Multi-Agent Systems, Tools, Artefacts for MAS, Activity Theory.
1 Tools, Language, and Artefacts
1.1 The Language Hype
“In the past, the major impetus for work on this general question has pre-
sented the . . . capacity for language as the explicandum, whereas the tool-
making and tool-using faculty has been taken for granted as an expectable
attribute . . . , and therefore requiring less scientiﬁc examination. This may
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reﬂect a deep logocentric philosophical bias on the part of western scholars,
and one that has had a very long history. Now that this bias has been
exposed for what it is, a whole new ﬁeld of questions has been opened up
. . . ” [6]
For a scholar in the agent ﬁeld today, the sentence above could easily ﬁt the
current, overall status of research on MASs (Multi-Agent Systems). Actually,
and quite interestingly, the citation comes instead from a well-respected an-
thropologist, late Gordon H. Hewes, studying and comparing the origins and
evolution of the two most distinctive faculties of humans: the ability to speak,
and the ability to use and make tools. Hewes observes how, after many decades
of activities by researchers from many diverse but related areas (such as biolog-
ical and social anthropology, archaeology, linguistics, psychology, neurology,
and ethology), only in very recent times the issue of the relation between lan-
guage, tools and the evolution of human cognitive abilities has been faced as
a single, coherent problem (see for instance [5]).
More or less in the same way, a sort of hype toward language is today still
quite evident in the MAS ﬁeld. Apart from the overwhelming number of agent
papers on communication, speech acts, and other language-related issues pub-
lished in the last years by agent-related conferences and journals, a striking
evidence comes for instance from the work by the only agent standardisa-
tion body, FIPA—dealing more or less exclusively with agent communication
actions, in spite of its being the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents.
In order to avoid (further) pernicious eﬀects of the same “logocentric philo-
sophical bias” in the MAS ﬁeld, some philosophical work is then required,
aimed at providing a shared conceptual view where agent actions could be
framed in their most general acceptation, actually accounting for both commu-
nicative and physical actions. Then, a notion of agent tool (or, an equivalent
one) is required, which could allow a theory of agent physical action to be de-
veloped at the same level of reﬁnement as the theory of agent communicative
actions.
1.2 A General View over Tools and Language
The ﬁrst characterisation of Homo Habilis is his ability to forge tools. Tools
are not an exclusive feature of humans: beavers build dams, bees construct
perfect hexagonal cells, many birds live in self-made nests. However, what is
often taken as a distinguishing feature of human tools with respect to other
animals’ ones is the cognitive level at which the tools are conceived, designed,
and used: apparently, tools are not part of human “embedded” behaviour,
as in bees or birds, but they are rather the result of the rational elaboration
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about the relationship between the human being and his habitat—his living
environment. Also, systematic and social design and use of tools is seemingly
typical of the human species, and is often taken as a measure of human against
animal intelligence.
More generally, our understanding of the strict relationship between tools
and intelligence (human and not human) is such that we typically interpret
tool-using and tool-making faculty as a fundamental revealing symptom of in-
telligence. For instance, ethologists commonly measure intelligence of animals
by making them face problems that require the use of tools to be solved (see
for instance [13]). Even more interestingly, a sort of tool-equivalent of the
Turing test has been proposed by philosopher Ronald Endicott, which was
aimed at evaluating intelligence in terms of the ability to exploit tools—the
so-called “Tooling Test for Intelligence” [16].
A tool, according to Martelet [8], reveals the user awareness of self or/and
of the world, whenever it is built with a goal, it is stored for further / repeated
use, it is used for building new tools. Tools are at the same time the ﬁrst and
most distinctive expression of human intelligence, along with language; and
also, the most powerful ampliﬁers of the (both individual and social) human
ability to aﬀect the environment—to survive environment change, ﬁrst, and
to change the environment for the human purposes, then.
Thus, when dealing with agent systems, and agent intelligence in partic-
ular, it turns to be awkwardly strange that most of the work till now has
elaborated on linguistic concepts and acts—as in the agent-pervasive theory
of speech acts—and has almost ignored, at least explicitly, the matter of agent
tools.
Less surprising, instead, is the fact that social / organisational theories
have well emphasised the role of tools in human activity, and their strict rela-
tion with language as well. For instance, central to Activity Theory (AT [9]) is
the notion of artefact as a mediator for any sort of interaction in human activ-
ities: artefacts can be either physical (such as blackboards, walls, and traﬃc
lights) or cognitive tools (such as operating procedures, heuristics, scripts, in-
dividual and collective experiences, and languages). Artefacts embody a set of
social practise: their design reﬂects a history of particular use. As mediating
instruments, they have both an enabling and a constraining function: on the
one hand, artefacts expand out possibilities to manipulate and transform dif-
ferent objects, but on the other hand the object is perceived and manipulated
not as such but within the limitations set by the tool.
So, on the one hand, artefacts are a quite general and powerful notion,
encompassing both physical and psychological tools—thus allowing physical
tools and language to be understood within the same conceptual framework.
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On the other hand, AT obviously suggests that artefacts could be used as
fundamental abstractions in the construction of agent systems—mostly as
enabling and constraining tools for agent activities. In the following then, we
generally talk about artefacts for MAS, or simply artefacts, so as to include
the most general notion of tool available.
1.3 Agens Faber vs. Agens Symbolicus?
Even the development of some of the most apparently “abstract” results of
human culture cannot be conceived or explained without the accompanying
physical artefacts. For instance, the evolution of numbers and arithmetic
cannot be explained separately by the tools used to record and compute them,
and by the social processes in which they were used in the ancient human
societies where they ﬁrst developed. The apparent duality between Homo
Faber or Homo Symbolicus [1]—who comes ﬁrst?—is obviously to be solved
without a winner: then, why should we choose between an Agens Faber and
an Agens Symbolicus while we aim at intelligent agents?
Accordingly, adopting an evolutionary perspective over agents, and car-
rying along the analogy with the development and evolution of human in-
telligence, we claim here that a theory of agent intelligence should not be
limited to the modelling of inner, rational processes (as in BDI theory), and
should instead include not only the basics of practical reasoning, but also a
suitable theory of the artefacts and the means for their rational use, selection,
construction and manipulation. This is in fact the idea behind of the Agens
Faber notion: agent intelligence should not be considered as separated by the
agent ability to perceive and aﬀect the environment—and so, that agent intel-
ligence is strictly related to the artefacts that enable, mediate and govern any
agent (intelligent) activity: in a sense, a specialised, agent-oriented version of
Brooks’ situated intelligence [2].
Along this line, in the remaining of this seminal paper we ﬁrst collect
some considerations of ours about the conceptual relation between agents and
artefacts, and the rational exploitation of artefacts by agents (Section 2).
Then, Section 3 sketches a possible model for artefacts for MAS (introduced
in [15]), then lists and groups a number of features that artefacts could exhibit
in order to enable and promote agent intelligent behaviour. Section 4 brings
the seeds for a more comprehensive theory of artefacts for MAS, by roughing
out a possible taxonomy of artefacts. Finally, Section 5 provides for ﬁnal
remarks along with some lines of future work.
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2 On the Relation between Agents and Artefacts
2.1 Goals of Agents and Use of Artefacts
By considering the conceptual framework described in [3], agents can be gen-
erally conceived as goal-governed or goal-oriented system. Goal-governed sys-
tems refer to the strong notion of agency, i.e. agents with some forms of cog-
nitive capabilities, which make it possible to explicitly represent their goals,
driving the selection of agent actions. Goal-oriented systems refer to the weak
notion of agency, i.e. agents whose behaviour is directly designed and pro-
grammed to achieve some goal, which is not explicitly represented. In both
goal-governed and goal-oriented systems, goals are internal. External goals
instead refer to goals which typically belong of the social context or environ-
ment where the agents are situated. External goals are sorts of regulatory
states which condition agent behaviour: a goal-governed system follows exter-
nal goals by adjusting internal ones.
This basic picture is then completed by systems which are not goal-
oriented. This is the case of passive objects, which are characterised by the
concept of use: they have not internal goals, but can be used by agents to
achieve their goals. Artefacts are objects explicitly designed to provide a cer-
tain function 4 , which guides their use. The concept of destination is related
but not identical the concept of function: it is an external goal which can be
attached to an object or an artefact by users, in the act of using it. Then
an artefact can be used according to a destination which is diﬀerent from its
function.
An interesting distinction has been proposed, concerning agents / artefacts
relationships, between use and use value [3]: there, use value corresponds to
the evaluation of artefact characteristics and function, in order to select it for
a (future) use. The distinction corresponds to two diﬀerent kinds of external
goals attached to an artefact: (i) the use-value goal, according to which the
artefact should allow user agents to achieve their objective—such an external
goal drives the agent selection of the artefact; (ii) the use goal, which directly
corresponds to the agent internal goal, which guides the actual usage of the
artefact. From the agent point of view, when an artefact is selected and used
it has then a use-value goal that somehow matches its internal goal.
By extending the above considerations, the classical tool-using / tool-
making distinction from anthropology can be articulated along three main
distinct aspects, which characterise the relationship between agents and arte-
4 The term “function” here refers to the functionality embodied by an artefact, and should
not be confused with the same term as used e.g. in mathematics or in programming lan-
guages
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facts:
• use
• selection
• construction and manipulation
While the ﬁrst two aspects are clearly related to use and use value, respec-
tively, the third is the rational consequence of a failure in the artefact selection
process, or in the use of a selected artefact. Then, a new, diﬀerent artefact
should be constructed, or obtained by manipulation of an existing one.
2.2 Agents Reasoning about Artefacts
One of the key issues of in the Agens Faber approach is how artefacts can be
eﬀectively exploited to improve agent ability to achieve individual as well as
social goals. The main questions to be answered are then: How should agents
reason to use artefacts in the best way, making their life simpler and their
action more eﬀective? How can agents reason to select artefacts to use? How
can agents reason to construct or adapt artefact behaviour in order to ﬁt their
goals?
On the one hand, the simplest case concerns agents directly programmed to
use speciﬁc artefacts, with usage protocols directly deﬁned by the programmer
either as part of the procedural knowledge / plans of the agent for goal-
governed systems, or as part of agent behaviour in goal-oriented system. In
spite of its simplicity, this case can bring several advantages for MAS engineers,
exploiting separation of concerns for programming simpler agents, by charging
some burden upon speciﬁcally-designed artefacts. On the other hand, the
intuition is that in the case of fully-open systems, the capability of the artefact
to describe itself, its function, interface, structure and behaviour could be the
key for building open MASs where intelligent agents dynamically look for and
select artefacts to use, and then exploit them for their own goals.
At a ﬁrst glance, it seems possible to frame the agent ability to use artefacts
in a hierarchy, according to ﬁve diﬀerent cognitive levels at which the agent
can use an artefact:
unaware use — at this level, both agents and agent designers exploit arte-
facts without being aware of it: the artefact is used implicitly, since it is not
denoted explicitly. In other words, the representation of agent actions never
refer explicitly to the execution of operation on some kind of artefacts.
embedded / programmed use — at this level, agents use some artefacts
according to what has been explicitly programmed by the designer: so, the
artefact selection is explicitly made by the designer, and the knowledge
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about its use is implicitly encoded by the designer in the agent. In the case
of cognitive agents, for instance, agent designers can specify usage protocols
directly as part of the agent plan. From the agent point of view, there is
no need to understand explicitly artefact operating instructions or function:
the only requirement is that the agent model adopted could be expressive
enough to model in some way the execution of external actions and the
perception of external events.
cognitive use — at this level, the agent designer directly embeds in the agent
knowledge about what artefacts to use, but how to exploit the artefacts is
dynamically discovered by the agent, reading the operating instructions.
Artefact selection is still a designer aﬀair, while how to use it is delegated
to the agent rational capabilities. So, generally speaking the agent must
be able to discover the artefact function, and the way to use it and to
make it ﬁt the agent goals. An obvious way to enable agent discovery is
to make artefact explicitly represent their function, interface, structure and
behaviour.
cognitive selection and use — at this level, agents autonomously select
artefacts to use, understand how to make them work, and then use them:
as a result, both artefact selection and use are in the hands of the agents.
It is worth noting that such a selection process could also concern sets of
cooperative agents, for instance interested in using a coordination artefact
for their social activities.
construction and manipulation — at this level, agents are lifted up to
the role of designers of artefacts. Here, agents are supposed to understand
how artefacts work, and how to adapt their behaviour (or to build new
ones from scratch) in order to devise out a better course of actions toward
the agent goals. For its complexity, this level more often concerns humans:
however, not-so-complex agents can be adopted to change artefact behaviour
according to some schema explicitly pre-deﬁned by the agent designers.
3 Features of an Artefact for MAS
By extending to artefacts for MAS in general the formal model for coordi-
nation artefacts deﬁned in [15] (and reported in brief in Subsection 3.1), we
discuss an essential feature of the Agens Faber approach: that is, a model for
agent reasoning where agent mental states and artefact behaviour are both
accounted for in a coherent way (Subsection 3.2). The notion of Agens Faber,
then, despite its apparent fuzziness, implicitly calls for a number of further
desirable artefact features, which are shortly discussed in Subsection 3.3.
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3.1 A Model of Artefacts for MAS
In order to allow for its rational exploitation by intelligent agents, an artefact
for MAS possibly exposes (i) a usage interface, (ii) operating instructions, and
(iii) a service description. On the one hand, this view of artefacts provides
us with a powerful key for the interpretation of the properties and features
of existing non-agent MAS abstractions, which can be then catalogued and
compared based on some common criteria. On the other hand, it is also
meant to foster the conceptual grounding for a principled methodology for
the engineering of MAS environment, where artefacts play the role of the core
abstractions.
Usage Interface — One of the core diﬀerences between artefacts and agents,
as computational entities populating a MAS, lays in the concept of oper-
ation, which is the means by which an artefact provides for a service or
function. An agent executes an action over an artefact by invoking an arte-
fact operation. Execution possibly terminates with an operation completion,
typically representing the outcome of the invocation, which the agent comes
to be aware of in terms of perception. The set of operations provided by an
artefact deﬁnes what is called its usage interface, which (intentionally) re-
sembles interfaces of services, components or objects—in the object-oriented
acceptation of the term.
In MASs, this interaction schema is peculiar to artefacts, and makes them
intrinsically diﬀerent from agents. While an agent has no interface, acts and
senses the environment, encapsulates its control, and brings about its goals
proactively and autonomously, an artefact has instead a usage interface, is
used by agents (and never the opposite), is driven by their control, and
automatises a speciﬁc service in a predictable way without the blessing of
autonomy. Hence, owning an interface strongly clearly diﬀerentiates agents
and artefacts, and is therefore to be used by the MAS engineer as basic
discriminative property between them.
Operating Instructions — Coupled with a usage interface, an artefact
could provide agents with operating instructions. Operating instructions
are a description of the procedure an agent has to follow to meaningfully
interact with an artefact over time. Most remarkably, one such description is
history dependent, so that actions and perceptions occurred at a given time
may inﬂuence the remainder of the interaction with the artefact. Therefore,
operating instructions are basically seen as an exploitation protocol of ac-
tions / perceptions. This protocol is possibly furthermore annotated with
information on the intended preconditions and eﬀects on the agent mental
state, which a rational agent should read and exploit to give a meaning to
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operating instructions. Artefacts being conceptually similar to devices used
by humans, operation instructions play a role similar to a manual, which
a human reads to know how to use the device on a step-by-step basis, and
depending on the expected outcomes he/she needs to achieve. For instance,
a digital camera provides buttons and panels (representing its usage inter-
face), and therefore comes with a manual describing how to use them—e.g.
which sequence of buttons are to be pushed to suitably conﬁgure the camera
resolution.
Function Description — Finally, an artefact could be characterised by a
function description (or service description). This is a description of the
functionality provided by the artefact, which agents can use essentially for
artefact selection. In fact, diﬀerently from operating instructions, which
describes how to exploit an artefact, function description describes what
to obtain from an artefact. Clearly, function description is an abstraction
over the actual implementation of the artefact: it hides inessential details
over the implementation of the service while highlighting key functional
(input/output) aspects of it, to be used by agents for artefact selection. For
instance, when modelling a sensor wrapper as an artefact, we may easily
think of the operations for sensor activation and inspection as described via
usage interface and operations instructions, while the information about the
sensory function itself being conveyed through function description of the
sensor wrapper.
3.2 Rational Exploitation of Artefacts
One of the key issues in the cognitive use of artefacts is how agents represent
actions over artefacts and include them in their deliberate course of actions.
The issue of rational exploitation of artefacts can be better formulated and
understood by formally modelling the relationship between agents and arte-
facts: agent actions over artefacts, agent mental states, and artefact operating
instructions. Following the model sketched above and introduced in [15], here
we assume a model for the mental state of agents similar to the one exploited
in the formal deﬁnition of the semantic language for deﬁning FIPA ACL se-
mantics [4]. The agent mental state is represented through a multi-modal logic
with modalities for beliefs (Bel ) and intentions (Int )—as far as exploiting an
artefact is concerned, we neglect modalities for uncertain beliefs and desires.
Hence, we consider the standard syntax for formulae
φ ::= t | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | φ ⇒ φ | Belφ | Intφ
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where t is any term. To enable reasoning about actions and perceptions, we
introduce the following operators (written in italics font), which are func-
tions used to build terms: done(a) stands for action a—i.e. an operation
invocation—being executed, schedule(a) stands for action a being scheduled,
completed(p) for perception of completion p—i.e. the completion of an oper-
ation invocation—being sensed, instr(I) for I being the current state of op-
erating instructions, trn(I, l, I ′) for instructions I allowing interaction l and
then moving to I ′, and feasible(I, φ) for mental state φ being a possible ef-
fect reachable from current operating instructions state I. In particular, we
assume the case where the agent (i) is interacting with only one artefact, (ii)
knows the current state of operating instructions (Bel instr(I) holds for pre-
cisely one I at a given time), (iii) understands the operational semantics of
operating instructions (Bel trn(I, l, I ′) holds if I l−→I I ′), and (iv) computes
the feasibility operator based on the operational semantics, that is through
relation trn above. For instance, relation feasible(I, φ) could be deﬁned as:
feasible(I, φ) if I
?t[φ]−−−→I I ′
feasible(I, φ) if I
l−→I I ′ ∧ feasible(I ′, φ)
saying that φ is feasible from I if it exists a sequence of interactions leading to
a completion with eﬀect φ. This deﬁnition is to be taken as a mere reference:
more specialised feasibility relations might be used which more eﬀectively
tackle computability and eﬃciency issues—whose details have however the
scope of agent internal machinery, not that of interaction semantics.
Concerning the eﬀect of interactions on the agent mental state, we simply
assume that:
• as an agent schedules an action a—that is, Int schedule(a) holds in the agent
mental state—then a is executed—the corresponding artefact operation is
actually invoked. Correspondingly, the agent comes to believe Bel done(a).
• an an agent perceives a completion p, then it comes to believe
Bel completed(p).
The formal model of agent behaviour is provided by reporting properties of
the logic for mental states in the style of the properties of SL language of
FIPA [4], handling planning, satisﬁability of preconditions and application of
eﬀects.
Planning — Given an intention Intφ and current operating instructions I,
let a1, . . . , an be the set of invocations possibly leading to eﬀect φ, that is
such that trn(I, !aj [φj ], I
′) and feasible(I ′, φ) (with 1 ≤ j ≤ n)—i.e., aj is
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allowed resulting in a state (I ′) where φ is feasible. Then it holds that
|= Intφ ⇒ Int done(a1| . . . |an)
which says that the agent intention to achieve φ generates the intention to
execute one of the allowed actions possibly leading to eﬀect φ.
Satisﬁability — Whenever an agent elects to perform an action (by the
planning property above), this property imposes the intention to seek sat-
isﬁability of the preconditions of this action. This is formalised by the
property
|= Int done(a) ∧ Bel instr(I) ∧ Bel trn(I, !a[φ], I ′)⇒ Intφ
Scheduling — Whenever an agent intends to execute an action whose pre-
conditions are satisﬁed, then it schedules that action, suitably updating
operating instructions. This idea is formalised by the property:
|= Int done(a) ∧ Bel instr(I) ∧ Bel trn(I, !a[φ], I ′) ∧ Belφ ⇒
Bel instr(I ′) ∧ Int schedule(a)
Mental eﬀect — Whenever an agent perceives the completion of an action,
it should believe the eﬀects of such a perception. This idea is formalised by
the property
|= Bel completed(p)∧Bel instr(I)∧Bel trn(I, ?p[φ], I ′)⇒ Belφ∧Bel instr(I ′)
These properties resemble in structure the ﬁve properties of SL language as
they appear in [4]. The essential diﬀerence, however, is that here preconditions
and eﬀects are bound to actions/perceptions by the operating instructions: so,
the interplay between agent mental states and interactions (agent actions over
the artefacts) makes into the logic, by means of the scheduling property.
3.3 Other Properties of Artefacts for MAS
Furthermore, artefacts can exhibit a number of other important features,
which possibly enhance agent ability to use them for their own purposes.
Inspectability — The state of an artefact, its content (whatever this means
in a speciﬁc artefact), its usage interface, operating instructions and func-
tion description might be all or partially available to agents through in-
spectability. Whereas in closed MASs this information could be hard-coded
in the agent—the artefact engineer develops the agents as well—, in open
MASs third-party agents should be able to dynamically join a society and
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get aware at run-time of the necessary information about the available arte-
facts. Also, artefacts are often in charge of critical MAS behaviour [10]:
being able to inspect a part or the whole of an artefact features and state
is likely to be a fundamental capability in order to understand and govern
the dynamics and behaviour of a MAS.
Controllability — Controllability is an obvious extension of the inspectabil-
ity property. The operational behaviour of an artefact should then not be
merely inspectable, but also controllable so as to allow engineers (or even
intelligent agents) to monitor its proper functioning: it should be possible
to stop and restart an artefact working cycle, to trace its inner activity, and
to observe and control a step-by-step execution. In principle, this would
largely improve the ability of monitoring, analysing and debugging at exe-
cution time the operational behaviour of an artifact, and of the associated
MAS social activities as well.
Malleability — Also related to inspectability, malleability (also called forge-
ability) is a key-feature in dynamic MAS scenarios, when the behaviour of
artefacts could require to be modiﬁed dynamically in order to adapt to the
changing needs or mutable external conditions of a MAS. Malleability, as
the ability to change the artefact behaviour at execution-time, is seemingly
a crucial aspect in on-line engineering for MASs, and also a perspective key
issue for self-organising MASs.
Predictability — Diﬀerently from agents—which as autonomous entities
have the freedom of behaving erratically, e.g. neglecting messages—, us-
age interface, operating instructions and function description can be used
as a contract with an artefact by an agent. In particular, function descrip-
tion can provide precise details of the outcomes of exploiting the artefact,
while operating instructions make the behaviour of an artefact predictable
for an agent.
Formalisability — The predictability feature can be easily related with for-
malisability. Due to the precise characterisation that can be given to an
artefact behaviour, until reaching e.g. a full operational semantics model—
for instance, as developed for coordination artefacts in [12]—it might be
feasible to automatically verify the properties and behaviour of the services
provided by artefacts, for this is intrinsically easier than services provided
by autonomous agents.
Linkability — Artefacts can be used encapsulate and model reusable ser-
vices in a MAS. To scale up with complexity of an environment, it might
be interesting to compose artefacts, e.g. to build a service incrementally on
top of another, by making a new artefact realising its service by interacting
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with an existing artefact. To this end, artefacts should be able to invoke
the operation of another artefact: the reply to that invocation will be trans-
mitted by the receiver through the invocation of another operation in the
sender.
Distribution — Diﬀerently from an agent, which is typically seen as a point-
like abstraction conceptually located to a single node of the newtwork, arte-
facts can also be distributed. In particular, a single artefact can in principle
be used to model a distributed service, accessible from more nodes of the
net. Using linkability, a distributed artefact can then be conceived and im-
plemented as a composition of linked, possibly non-distributed artefacts—or
viceversa, a number of linked artefacts, scattered through a number of dif-
ferent physical locations could be altogether seen as a single distributed
artefact. Altogether, distribution and linkability promote the layering of
artefact engineering—as sketched in Section 4.
As a ﬁnal remark, it should be noted that all the artefact features presented
above play a diﬀerent role when seen from the diﬀerent viewpoints of agents
and of MAS engineers. For instance, operating instructions are mostly to be
seen as a design tool for engineers, as well as a run-time support for rational
agents. Instead, features like inspectability and malleability gain particular
interest when the two viewpoints can be made one: when an intelligent agent
is allowed and capable to play the role of the MAS engineer, it can in principle
understand the state and dynamics of the MAS by observing the artefacts,
then possibly working as an Agens Faber: that is, by re-working its tools (the
artefacts) in order to suitably change the overall MAS behaviour.
4 Toward a Taxonomy of Artefacts for MAS
Many sorts of diﬀerent artefacts can populate a MAS, providing agents with a
number of diﬀerent services, embodying a variety of diverse models, technolo-
gies and tools, and addressing a wide range of application issues. Correspond-
ingly, a huge variety of approaches and solutions are in principle available for
MAS engineers when working to shape the agent environment according to
their application needs. So, the mere model of artefacts for MAS is no longer
enough: a taxonomy of artefacts comes to be useful, which could help MAS
engineers ﬁrst deﬁning the basic classes of artefacts, their diﬀerences and pecu-
liarities, then classifying known artefacts, to understand and possibly compare
them.
Among the many possible criteria for a taxonomy, we ﬁnd it useful to
focus on the mediation role of the artefact, and then discriminate artefacts
based on the sort of the (non-artefact) MAS entities they are meant to tie
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Fig. 1. Individual, social, and resource artefacts: a layered view of artefacts for MAS
together. According to the pictorial representation in Fig. 1, our ﬁrst proposal
here divides artefacts into individual artefacts, social artefacts, and resource
artefacts.
Individual artefacts are artefacts exploited by one agent only—in other
terms, an individual artefact mediates between an individual agent and the
environment. Individual artefacts can serve several purposes, including ex-
ternally enhancing agent capabilities—such as e.g. adding a private external
memory—, enacting a ﬁltering policy of the agent actions toward other arte-
facts (as in the case of agent coordination contexts [11]), providing individual
agents with useful information on the organisation, and so on. In general,
individual artefacts are not directly aﬀected by the activity of other agents,
but can, through linkability, interact with other artefacts in the MAS.
Social artefacts are instead artefact exploited by more than one agent—
in other terms, a social artefact mediate between two or more agents in a
MAS. In general, social artefacts typically provide a service which is in the
ﬁrst place meant to achieve a social goal of the MAS, rather than an indi-
vidual agent goal. For instance, social artefacts might provide a coordination
service [14], governing the activities of two or more agents—as e.g. in a multi-
party protocols—, but can also realise global knowledge repositories, shared
ontologies, or organisation abstractions containing information on roles and
permissions.
Finally, resource artefacts are artefacts that conceptually wrap external
resources—in other terms, a resource artefact mediates between a MAS and
an external resource. External resources can be either legacy components and
tools, applications written with non-agent technologies because of engineering
convenience—such as Web Services—, or physical resources which the agents
of a MAS might need to act upon and sense. In principle, resource arte-
facts can be conceived as a means to raise external MAS resources up to the
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agent cognitive level. In fact, they provide external resources with an usage
interface, some operating instructions, and a service description, and realise
their task by dynamically mapping high-level agent interactions upon lower-
level interactions with the resources—using e.g. speciﬁc transports such as
object-oriented local or remote method calls, HTTP requests, and the like.
Altogether, individual, social and resource artefacts can be used as the
basis for building the glue keeping agents together in a MAS, and for struc-
turing the environment where agents live and interact. In fact, our taxonomy,
as apparent from Fig. 1, deﬁnes a structured, layered view over the MAS
environment, and implicitly suggests a model for organising agent interac-
tion within a MAS. As such, the artefact taxonomy could lead in principle to
a well-principle foundation for a general agent-oriented methodology for the
engineering of the agent environment as a ﬁrst-class entity.
5 Conclusion
By drawing an analogy between intelligence in MASs and the development
and evolution of human intelligence, in this seminal paper we elaborated on
agent tools, and their relationship with agent intelligence. Our notion of
Agens Faber comes to say that a theory of agent intelligence should not be
limited to modelling the inner rational process of an agent, but should instead
include not only the basics of practical reasoning, but also a theory of the
agent artefacts, providing agents with the means for artefact rational use,
selection, construction, and manipulation. Along this line, we ﬁrst discuss a
possible model of artefacts for MAS, and show how it aﬀects the exploitation
of artefacts by rational agents, then we list a set of relevant artefact features.
Finally, a preliminary proposal for a taxonomy of artefacts for MAS is shortly
discussed.
In the future, we plan to go deep along the many lines sketched in this
paper: for instance, by accounting for the many mental processes that are
known to be relevant in the social use of tools (such as teaching and imitation),
or by discussing the possible impact of a precise and comprehensive artefact
taxonomy on the engineering of complex MASs.
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